In Defence Of This Proposition, That Matter Is Created, And That Evil Hath Not Its Cause In Matter.
CHAPTER ONE
Of The Sea And Its Appointed Bounds
1 Hermogenes: As I walked yesterday at even, my friend, by the shore of the sea, and beheld it somewhat earnestly, I saw a marvellous token of divine power, and a work wrought by wise knowledge, if so be that such a thing may be called a work.
2 For as that verse of Homer saith: As when two contrary winds blowing out of Thrace, Boreas and Zephyrus, do suddenly vex the fishy deep, and round about the dark flood, lifted high, casteth forth the salt weed upon the shore;
3 Even so it seemed unto me to have come to pass yesterday.
4 For I saw waves very like unto the tops of mountains, and, as it were, reaching even unto heaven itself.
5 Wherefore I looked for nothing else but that the whole land should be overflowed, and I began to devise in my mind a place of escape, and an ark of Noah.
6 But it was not as I thought; for even as the sea rose up unto a crest, it brake again into itself, and passed not beyond its own bounds, having, as it were, reverence for a divine decree.
7 And as oftentimes a servant, being compelled by his master to do somewhat against his will, obeyeth the commandment through fear, while he dareth not utter a word of that which he suffereth in doing it unwillingly, but, being full of wrath, muttereth within himself;
8 Even so it appeared unto me that the sea, as though enraged, and shutting up its awe within itself, restrained itself, as not willing that its Master should perceive its anger.
CHAPTER TWO
Of Heaven, Sun, Moon, And Divine Government
1 Hermogenes: Upon these things I began to gaze in silence, and desired in my mind to measure the heaven and the sphere thereof.
2 I began to inquire whence it riseth, and where it setteth; also what manner of motion it hath, whether a progressive motion, that is to say, from place to place, or a revolving motion; and moreover how its movement is continued.
3 And verily it seemed worth the labour to inquire also concerning the sun: after what manner he is set in the heaven; and what circuit he passeth through; and whither, after a little while, he withdraweth himself; and why even he goeth not forth from his appointed course.
4 But he also, as one may say, observeth the commandment of a higher power, and appeareth with us only when he is suffered so to do, and departeth as though he were called away.
5 So, while I searched out these things, I saw that the light of the sun departed, and that the daylight failed, and that straightway darkness came on.
6 And the moon succeeded the sun; which, at her first rising, was not of full measure, but after she had advanced in her course, she shewed herself greater in appearance.
7 And I ceased not to inquire concerning her also, but searched out the cause of her waning and waxing, and why she too observeth the revolution of days.
8 And from all these things it seemed unto me that there is a divine government and power ruling the whole, which we may justly call God.
CHAPTER THREE
Of The Creator And The Origin Of Things
1 Hermogenes: And thereupon I began to praise the Creator, when I beheld the earth fast fixed, and living creatures in so great variety, and the blossoms of plants with their manifold colours.
2 But my mind rested not upon these things alone; but thereupon I began to inquire whence they had their beginning, whether from some source eternally co-existent with God, or from Himself alone, none co-existing with Him.
3 For that He made nothing out of that which hath no being seemed unto me the right judgment to hold, unless my reason were altogether unworthy of trust.
4 For it is the nature of things which come into being to take their beginning from that which already existeth.
5 And it seemed unto me that this also might be said with equal truth: that nothing distinct from God is eternally co-existent with Him, but that whatsoever existeth hath its beginning from Him.
6 And herein also was I persuaded by the undeniable ordering of the elements, and by the fair arrangement of nature round about them.
7 So, with such thoughts concerning the goodly order of things, I returned unto mine house.
CHAPTER FOUR
Of The Evils Beheld Among Men
1 Hermogenes: But on the day following, that is, today, as I came forth, I saw two beings of one race, men I mean, smiting and reviling one another; and another also seeking to strip his neighbour.
2 And now certain men began to dare a more terrible deed; for one stripped a corpse, and brought forth again unto the light of day a body which had once been hidden in the earth.
3 And he entreated a form like unto his own with such despite, that he left the corpse to be meat for dogs.
4 And another drew his sword, and set upon a man like unto himself.
5 And the one desired to obtain safety by flight; but the other ceased not from pursuing, neither would he bridle his wrath.
6 And what need is there that I should say more?
7 It is enough that he assaulted him, and straightway smote him with his sword.
8 So the wounded man became a suppliant unto his fellow, and stretched forth his hands in supplication, and was willing to give up his raiment, asking only that his life might be spared.
9 But the other subdued not his anger, neither pitied his fellow man, neither would he behold his own image in the being before him.
10 But, like a wild beast, he made ready with his sword to feed upon him.
11 And now he even brought his mouth near unto the body so like his own, so great was the measure of his rage.
12 And there was to be seen one man suffering wrong, and another straightway stripping him, and not even covering with earth the body which he had made naked of clothing.
13 And besides these things, there was another who, robbing others of their marriage rights, desired to defile his neighbour’s wife.
14 And he urged her to turn aside unto unlawful embraces, not willing that her husband should be father unto a child of his own.
15 After this I began to believe the tragedies, and thought that the banquet of Thyestes had truly come to pass.
16 And I believed also the unlawful lust of Oinomaos, neither did I doubt the strife wherein brother drew the sword against brother.
CHAPTER FIVE
Of The Origin Of Evil And The Innocence Of God
1 Hermogenes: Therefore, after I had beheld such things as these, I began to inquire whence they arise, and what is their beginning.
2 And I asked who is the author of such devices against men, whence came their discovery, and who is the teacher of them.
3 Now to dare to say that God was the author of these things was impossible.
4 For surely it could not even be said that they have from Him either their substance or their being.
5 For how were it possible to conceive such thoughts concerning God?
6 For He is good, and the Creator of that which is excellent, and unto Him belongeth no evil thing.
7 Nay, it is His nature to take no pleasure in such things; but He forbiddeth their production, and rejecteth those who delight in them, yet receiveth into His presence those who avoid them.
8 And how could it be other than absurd to call God the maker of those things which He disalloweth?
9 For He would not will them not to be, if He Himself had first been their creator.
10 And He willeth that those who draw near unto Him should be imitators of Him.
11 Wherefore it seemed unto me unreasonable to ascribe these things unto God, or to say that they had sprung from Him.
CHAPTER SIX
Of Matter As The Feigned Cause Of Evil
1 Hermogenes: Yet it must surely be granted that somewhat may come into being out of that which hath no being, if He made that which is evil.
2 For He who brought them into being out of non-being would not reduce them again unto the loss thereof.
3 And again, it must be said that there was once a time when God took pleasure in evil things, which now is not the case.
4 Wherefore it seemeth unto me impossible to speak thus concerning God.
5 For it is unfitting to His nature to attach this unto Him.
6 Wherefore it seemed unto me that there is co-existent with Him somewhat which hath the name of matter, from which He formed the things that exist, distinguishing them by wise art, and ordering them in fair array.
7 From this also evil things seem to have come into being.
8 Forasmuch as this matter was without quality or form, and besides this was borne about without order, and was untouched by divine art, God grudged it not, neither left it to be borne about continually in such wise.
9 But He began to work upon it, and willed to separate its better parts from its worse, and thus made all that it was fitting for God to make out of it.
10 But so much thereof as was like lees, as it were, being unfit to be made into anything, He left as it was, because it was of no use unto Him.
11 And from this it seemeth unto me that what is evil hath now flowed down among men.
12 This seemed unto me the right judgment to hold concerning these things.
13 But, my friend, if thou thinkest that aught which I have spoken is wrong, declare it; for I greatly desire to hear concerning these things.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Of The Impossibility Of Two Uncreated Substances
1 Megethius: That two uncreated substances cannot exist at one and the same time, I suppose thou holdest alike with me.
2 Yet thou seemest very firmly to have assumed and brought into the argument this principle: that of unavoidable necessity we must maintain one of two things: either that God is separate from matter, or else, on the contrary, that He is inseparably joined unto it.
3 If then any man choose to affirm that He existeth in union with matter, he saith thereby that there is but one uncreated substance.
4 For one of the two must be a part of the other; and since they make parts one of another, they cannot be two uncreated substances.
5 For as, speaking of man, we describe him not as divided into many distinct parts, each forming a separate created substance, but, as reason requireth, say that he was made by God one created substance consisting of many parts; even so, if God be not separate from matter, we are driven to conclude that there is but one uncreated substance.
6 But if, on the other hand, it be affirmed that He is separate from matter, it followeth of necessity that there is some other substance set between the two, whereby their separation is made manifest.
7 For it is impossible that one thing should be shown to be severed by an interval from another, unless there be somewhat else whereby the interval between them is produced.
8 This principle also holdeth good not only in this or in any single case, but in as many cases as thou wilt. For the same argument which we have used concerning two uncreated substances must likewise be valid if the substances in question be given as three.
9 For concerning these also I should have to inquire whether they be separate one from another, or whether, contrariwise, each of them be united to his fellow.
10 For if thou shouldest say they are united, thou wouldest hear from me the same argument as before; but if, contrariwise, thou shouldest say they are separate, thou couldest not escape the necessary assumption of a separating medium.
11 If again perchance any man think that a third view may be consistently maintained concerning uncreated substances, namely, that God is neither separate from matter nor united to it as a part, but that God existeth in matter as in a place, or perchance matter existeth in God, let such an one mark the consequence:
12 That if we make matter the place of God, we must of necessity confess that He may be contained, and that He is circumscribed by matter.
13 Nay further, he must grant that He is, after the same manner as matter, carried hither and thither, unable to keep His place and to abide where He is, seeing that that wherein He existeth is ever being carried now this way and now that.
14 Besides this, he must also confess that God hath had His place among the worst kind of elements.
15 For if matter was once in disorder, and if He reduced it into order for the purpose of making it better, there was a time when God existed among the disordered elements of matter.
16 I might also fairly ask this question: whether God filled the whole of matter, or was in some part thereof.
17 If any man choose to say that God was in some part of matter, he maketh Him immeasurably less than matter, inasmuch as a part thereof contained the whole of Him; but if he maintain that He pervaded the whole of matter, I must needs be told how He became the Fashioner of this matter.
18 For we must of necessity suppose either that there was on God’s part, as it were, a contraction of Himself and a withdrawal from matter, whereupon He proceeded to fashion that from which He had retired; or else that He fashioned Himself together with matter, because He had no place whither to retire.
19 But if, on the other hand, it be maintained that matter is in God, it shall behove us likewise to inquire whether we are to understand thereby that He is sundered from Himself, and that as the air containeth divers kinds of living creatures, so is He sundered and divided into parts for the receiving of those creatures which from time to time exist in Him; or whether matter is in God as in a place, as water is contained in earth.
20 For if we should say, as in air, we should of necessity speak of God as divisible into parts; but if, as water in earth, and if matter was, as is granted, in confusion and disorder, and moreover contained that which was evil, then must we confess that God is the place of disorder and evil.
21 But this seemeth not to me a thing to be spoken with reverence, but rather a perilous saying.
22 For thou contendest that matter is uncreated, that thou mayest not confess God to be the author of evil; and yet, while thou seekest to escape this difficulty, thou makest Him the receptacle of evil.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Of Evil, Qualities, And Creation From Nothing
1 Megethius: If thou hadst said that thy suspicion that matter was uncreated arose from the nature of created things as we find them, I should have used abundant argument to prove that it cannot be so.
2 But since thou hast spoken of the existence of evil as the cause of such suspicion, I am minded to enter upon a separate examination of this matter.
3 For when it hath once been made clear how evil existeth, and when it is seen that it is impossible to deny God to be the author of evil, if He had recourse to matter for His materials, then it seemeth to me that suspicion of this sort vanisheth.
4 Thou affirmest, then, that matter, void of all qualities either good or evil, co-existed from the beginning with God, and that out of it He fashioned the world as now we find it.
5 Hermogenes: Such is mine opinion.
6 Megethius: Well then, if matter was without any qualities, and the world hath come into being from God, and if the world possesseth qualities, God must be the author of those qualities.
7 Hermogenes: Even so.
8 Megethius: Since also I heard thee say thyself but now that out of nothing nothing can possibly come, give me answer to the question which I am about to ask thee.
9 Thou seemest to me to think that the qualities of the world have not sprung from qualities already existing, and moreover that they are other than the substances themselves.
10 Hermogenes: I do.
11 Megethius: If therefore God produced not those qualities from qualities already existing, nor yet from substances, because they are not substances, the conclusion is unavoidable: they were made by God out of nothing.
12 So thou didst seem to affirm more than was warranted, when thou saidst that it had been proved impossible to hold that anything was made by God out of nothing.
13 But let us set the matter thus.
14 We see men among ourselves making certain things out of nothing, though it be true that they make them by means of something.
15 Let us take our example from builders.
16 These men make not cities out of cities, nor likewise temples out of temples.
17 Nay, if thou supposest that, because the substances needful for these buildings are already provided, therefore they make them out of that which already existeth, thy reasoning is fallacious.
18 For it is not the substance that maketh the city or the temples, but the art which is employed about the substance.
19 Neither again doth the art proceed from any art inhering in the substances, but it ariseth apart from any such art in them.
20 But I suppose thou wilt meet the argument by saying that the craftsman produceth the art manifest in the substance which he hath fashioned out of the art which he himself already hath.
21 Yet in reply to this, I think it may fairly be said that neither in man doth art spring from any art already existing.
22 For we cannot allow that art existeth by itself, since it belongeth unto the class of accidents, which receive their existence only when they appear in connection with substance.
23 For man shall exist though there be no architecture; but architecture shall have no existence unless first there be man.
24 Thus we cannot avoid the conclusion that it is the nature of art to arise in man out of nothing.
25 If then we have shown this to be so with man, surely we must allow that God can make not only the qualities of substances out of nothing, but also the substances themselves.
26 For if it appeareth possible that anything whatsoever can be made out of nothing, it is proved that this may also be the case with substances.
27 But since thou art specially desirous to inquire concerning the origin of evil, I will proceed unto the discussion of this matter.
28 And I would ask thee a few questions.
29 Is it thine opinion that evil things are substances, or that they are qualities of substances?
30 Hermogenes: Qualities of substances, I am disposed to say.
31 Megethius: But matter was void of qualities and of form: this I assumed at the beginning of the discussion.
32 Therefore, if evil things are qualities of substances, and matter was void of qualities, and thou hast called God the author of qualities, then God shall also be the fashioner of that which is evil.
33 Since then it is not possible, on this supposition any more than on the other, to speak of God as not the cause of evil, it seemeth to me superfluous to add matter unto Him, as though that were the cause of evil.
34 If thou hast any answer to make unto this, begin thine argument.
CHAPTER NINE
Of Evil Things As Actions And Not Substances
1 Hermogenes: If indeed our disputation had arisen from love of contention, I would not be willing that the inquiry concerning the origin of evil should be raised a second time; but since we are moved rather by friendship and by the good of our neighbour to enter into controversy, I readily consent that the question be taken up anew upon this matter.
2 Thou hast doubtless long known the disposition of my mind, and the end at which I aim in dispute: that I desire not to vanquish falsehood by plausible reasoning, but rather that truth should be established by thorough examination.
3 Thou thyself also art of the same mind, I am well assured.
4 Whatsoever method therefore thou deemest profitable for the discovery of truth, shrink not from using it.
5 For by following a better course of argument thou shalt not only profit thyself, but most certainly me also, instructing me concerning matters whereof I am ignorant.
6 Megethius: Thou seemest plainly to agree with me that evil things are in some sort substances; for apart from substances I see not that they have any existence.
7 Since then, my good friend, thou sayest that evil things are substances, it is necessary to inquire into the nature of substance.
8 Is it thine opinion that substance is a kind of bodily structure?
9 Hermogenes: It is.
10 Megethius: And doth that bodily structure exist by itself, without needing any one to come and give it existence?
11 Hermogenes: Yea.
12 Megethius: And doth it seem unto thee that evil things are connected with certain courses of action?
13 Hermogenes: Such is my belief.
14 Megethius: And do actions come into existence only when there is an actor?
15 Hermogenes: Yea.
16 Megethius: And where there is no actor, shall his action ever take place?
17 Hermogenes: It shall not.
18 Megethius: If therefore substance is a kind of bodily structure, and this needeth not some one in and through whom it may receive its existence, and if evil things are the actions of some one, and actions require some one in and through whom they receive their existence, then evil things shall not be substances.
19 And if evil things are not substances, and murder is an evil and is the action of some one, it followeth that murder is not a substance.
20 But if thou insist that agents are substance, then I myself agree with thee.
21 A man, for example, who is a murderer, insofar as he is a man, is a substance; but the murder which he committeth is not a substance, but a work of the substance.
22 Moreover, we sometimes call a man evil because he committeth murder, and sometimes again good because he doeth deeds of beneficence; and these names cleave to the substance by reason of the things which are accidents thereof, which nevertheless are not the substance itself.
23 For neither is the substance murder, nor again is it adultery, nor any other such evil.
24 But as the grammarian receiveth his name from grammar, and the orator from oratory, and the physician from physic, though the substance is not physic, nor oratory, nor grammar, but receiveth its appellation from the things which are accidents thereof, from which it commonly receiveth its name, though it is not any one of them; even so in like manner it appeareth to me that the substance receiveth a name from things accounted evil, though it is not itself any one of them.
25 I beseech thee also to consider that, if thou represent some other being as the cause of evil unto men, he also, insofar as he worketh in them and stirreth them up to do evil, is himself evil by reason of the things which he doeth.
26 For he too is called evil for this simple reason, that he is the doer of evil things; but the things which a being doeth are not the being himself, but his actions, from which he receiveth his appellation and is called evil.
27 For if we should say that the things which he doeth are himself, and these consist in murder, adultery, theft, and such like, then these things shall be himself.
28 And if these things are himself, and if when they are done they obtain a substantial existence, but when they are not done they cease also to exist, and if these things are done by men, then men shall be the doers of these things and the causes both of their existing and of their no longer existing.
29 But if thou affirm that these things are his actions, he becometh evil from the things he doeth, not from those things whereof his substance consisteth.
30 Moreover, we have said that he is called evil from those things which are accidents of the substance, which are not themselves the substance; as a physician is named from the art of physic.
31 But if he receiveth the beginning of his existence from the actions which he performeth, then he too began to be evil, and these evil things likewise began to exist.
32 And if so, an evil being shall not be without beginning, nor shall evil things be unoriginated, since we have said that they are originated by him.
33 Hermogenes: The argument concerning the opinion which I before expressed, thou seemest to me, my friend, to have handled satisfactorily; for from the premises which thou didst assume in the discussion, I think thou hast drawn a fair conclusion.
34 For doubtless, if matter was at first void of qualities, and if God is the fashioner of the qualities which it now hath, and if evil things are qualities, then God is the author of those evil things.
35 The argument then concerning that opinion we may consider well discussed; and to me it now seemeth false to speak of matter as void of qualities.
36 For it is not possible to say of any substance whatsoever that it is without qualities.
37 For in the very act of saying that it is void of qualities, thou dost in fact declare its quality, showing what kind of thing matter is; which of course is to ascribe unto it a species of quality.
38 Wherefore, if it be agreeable unto thee, rehearse the argument to me from the beginning; for to me matter seemeth to have had qualities from all eternity.
39 For in this way I can affirm that evil things also proceed from it by way of emanation, so that the cause of evil things may not be ascribed unto God, but that matter may be regarded as the cause of all such things.
CHAPTER TEN
Of Matter Supposed To Have Qualities From Everlasting
1 Megethius: I approve thy desire, my friend, and praise the zeal which thou manifestest in the discussion of opinions.
2 For it surely becometh every one that desireth knowledge, not simply and forthwith to agree with what is said, but to make careful examination of the arguments adduced.
3 For though a disputant, by laying down false premises, may make his opponent draw the conclusion which he willeth, yet he shall not thereby persuade a hearer; he persuadeth only when he saith that which seemeth possible to be said with fairness.
4 So that one of two things shall come to pass: either, as he hearkeneth, he shall be decisively helped to reach that conclusion toward which he already feeleth himself moved, or he shall convict his adversary of speaking not the truth.
5 Now it seemeth to me that thou hast not sufficiently discussed the statement that matter had qualities from the beginning.
6 For if this be so, whereof shall God be the maker?
7 For if we speak of substances, we affirm that these existed beforehand; and if again of qualities, we declare that these also existed already.
8 Since therefore both substance and qualities exist, it seemeth to me unreasonable to call God a creator.
9 But lest I should seem to frame an argument to serve mine own purpose, be pleased to answer the question: In what manner dost thou assert God to be a creator?
10 Is He such because He changed the substances, so that they should no longer be the same as once they were, but should become different from what they were; or because, while He kept the substances the same as they were before that time, He changed their qualities?
11 Hermogenes: I do not at all think that any alteration took place in substances; for it seemeth unto me absurd to say this.
12 But I affirm that a certain change was made in their qualities; and in respect of these I speak of God as a creator.
13 As we might speak of a house as made out of stones, in which case we could not say that the stones cease to be stones as touching their substance, now that they are made into a house (for I affirm that the house oweth its existence to the quality of its construction, forasmuch as the former quality of the stones hath been changed); so it seemeth unto me that God, while the substance remaineth the same, hath made a certain change in its qualities; and in respect of such change I speak of the origin of this world as having come from God.
14 Megethius: Since then thou maintainest that a certain change, namely of qualities, hath been produced by God, answer me briefly what I desire to ask thee.
15 Hermogenes: Proceed, I pray thee, with thy question.
16 Megethius: Dost thou agree in the opinion that evil things are qualities of substances?
17 Hermogenes: I do.
18 Megethius: Were these qualities in matter from the beginning, or did they begin to be?
19 Hermogenes: I hold that these qualities existed together with matter, without being originated.
20 Megethius: But dost thou not affirm that God hath made a certain change in the qualities?
21 Hermogenes: That do I affirm.
22 Megethius: For the better, or for the worse?
23 Hermogenes: For the better, I should say.
24 Megethius: Well then, if evil things are qualities of matter, and if the Lord of all changed its qualities for the better, whence, it behoveth us to ask, come evil things?
25 For either the qualities remained the same in their nature as they were before; or, if they were not evil before, but thou assertest that, by reason of a change wrought upon them by God, the first qualities of this kind came into being in connection with matter, then God shall be the author of evil, inasmuch as He changed qualities which were not evil so as to make them evil.
26 Perchance, however, it is not thy view that God changed evil qualities for the better; but thou meanest that all those other qualities which happened to be neither good nor evil were changed by God for the adornment of the creation.
27 Hermogenes: That hath been mine opinion from the beginning.
28 Megethius: How then canst thou say that He hath left the qualities of evil things even as they were?
29 Was it that, although He was able to destroy those qualities as well as the others, He was not willing; or did He refrain because He had not the power?
30 For if thou say He had the power, but not the will, thou must confess Him to be the cause of these qualities; since, when He could have made an end of the existence of evil, He chose to let it remain as it was, and that too at the very time when He began to fashion matter.
31 For if He had not concerned Himself at all with matter, He would not have been the cause of those things which He suffered to remain.
32 But seeing that He fashioned a certain part of it, and left a certain part as we have described it, though He could have changed that also for the better, it seemeth to me that blame is deservedly cast upon Him, for He permitted a part of matter to be evil, unto the ruin of that other part which He fashioned.
33 Nay more, it seemeth to me that the most grievous wrong hath been done concerning this part, in that He so constituted this part of matter as now to be affected by evil.
34 For if we should examine things carefully, we should find that the condition of matter is now worse than in its former state, before it was brought into order.
35 For before it was separated into parts, it had no sense of evil; but now every one of its parts is afflicted with a sense of evil.
36 Take an example from man.
37 Before he was fashioned and became a living being through the art of the Creator, he was by nature free from any contact whatsoever with evil; but as soon as he was made by God a man, he became liable to the sense even of approaching evil; and thus that very thing which thou sayest was brought about by God for the benefit of matter is found rather to have turned unto its hurt.
38 But if thou say that evil hath not been stayed because God was unable to do away with it, thou makest God powerless.
39 But if He be powerless, it shall be either because He is weak by nature, or because He is overcome by fear and brought into subjection by one stronger.
40 If then thou go so far as to say that God is weak by nature, it seemeth to me that thou imperillest thine own salvation; but if thou say that He is weak through being overcome by fear of one greater, then evil things shall be greater than God, since they frustrate the carrying out of His purpose.
41 But this, as it seemeth to me, would be absurd to say of God.
42 For why should not they rather be accounted gods, since according to thy account they are able to overcome God; if, that is to say, by God we mean that which hath ruling power over all things?
CHAPTER ELEVEN
Of Matter, Simple And Compound, And Of Opposites
1 Megethius: But I desire to ask thee a few questions concerning matter itself.
2 Tell me therefore, I pray thee, whether matter was a simple thing or compound.
3 I am led to take this way of searching into the matter before us by considering the diversity that obtaineth in existing things.
4 For if perchance matter was something simple and uniform, how cometh it that the world is compound, and consisteth of divers substances and combinations?
5 For by compound we mean a mixture of certain simple elements.
6 But if contrariwise thou prefer to call matter compound, thou wilt of course affirm that it is compounded of certain simple elements.
7 And if it was compounded of simple elements, these simple elements must at some time or other have existed separately by themselves; and when they were compounded together, matter came into being: wherefrom it followeth of course that matter is created.
8 For if matter is compound, and compound things are constituted from simple things, there was once a time when matter had no existence, namely, before the simple elements came together.
9 And if there was once a time when matter was not, and there was never a time when the uncreated was not, matter cannot be uncreated.
10 And hence there shall be many uncreated substances.
11 For if God was uncreated, and the simple elements whereof matter was compounded were also uncreated, there shall not be two uncreated things only, not to discuss the question what it is that constituteth simple objects, whether matter or form.
12 Is it further thine opinion that nothing which existeth is opposed to itself?
13 Hermogenes: It is.
14 Megethius: Is water then opposed to fire?
15 Hermogenes: So it appeareth to me.
16 Megethius: Likewise, is darkness opposed to light, and heat to cold, and moreover moisture to dryness?
17 Hermogenes: It seemeth to me to be so.
18 Megethius: Well then, if nothing that existeth is opposed to itself, and these things are opposed one to another, they cannot be one and the same matter; nay, nor yet be made out of one and the same matter.
19 I desire further to ask thine opinion on a matter akin to that whereof we have been speaking.
20 Dost thou believe that the parts of a thing are not mutually destructive?
21 Hermogenes: I do.
22 Megethius: And dost thou believe that fire and water, and the like, are parts of matter?
23 Hermogenes: Quite so.
24 Megethius: Dost thou not also believe that water is destructive of fire, and light of darkness, and so of all like things?
25 Hermogenes: Yea.
26 Megethius: Well then, if the parts of a whole are not mutually destructive, and yet the parts of matter are mutually destructive, they cannot be parts of one matter.
27 And if they are not parts one of another, they cannot be composed of one and the same matter; nay, they cannot be matter at all, since nothing that existeth is destructive of itself, as we learn from the doctrine of opposites: for nothing is opposed to itself, an opposite being by nature opposed to something else.
28 White, for example, is not opposed to itself, but is said to be the opposite of black; and likewise light is shown not to be opposed to itself, but is accounted an opposite in relation to darkness; and so with a very great number of things besides.
29 If then matter were some one thing, it could not be opposed to itself.
30 This then being the nature of opposites, it is proved that matter, so conceived, hath no existence.
Here Endeth The Dialekticon.
